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 A CORE EXISTENCE THEOREM FOR GAMES WITHOUT
 ORDERED PREFERENCES
 BY KIM C. BORDER'
 1. INTRODUCTION
 TO A LARGE EXTENT the cooperative theory of games has an altogether different
 appearance from the noncooperative theory. The noncooperative theory generally deals
 with games in either extensive form or normal form, while the cooperative theory is usually
 described in characteristic function form. One of the central concepts in the cooperative
 theory is that of the core, which is the set of utility allocations which no coalition can
 improve upon. This notion of the core and of the characteristic function form of a game
 depends heavily on the existence of a utility representation for players' preferences. Recently
 Gale and Mas-Colell [3] and Shafer and Sonnenschein [6] have proven theorems on the
 existence of a Nash equilibrium for noncooperative games in normal form in which the
 players' preferences over strategy vectors are not necessarily complete or transitive and
 so may fail to have a utility representation. Thus it might appear that the noncooperative
 theory is applicable in environments where the cooperative theory is not. In order to
 formulate theorems in the cooperative theory of games which can be applied to environ-
 ments in which players may have nonordered preferences, the characteristic function must
 be reformulated in terms of physical outcomes as opposed to utility outcomes. The players'
 preferences can then be expressed in terms of the physical outcomes without the use of
 a utility function.
 Characterizing a game in terms of the physical outcomes that a coalition can enforce
 for its members is not a new idea. This is implicitly the model used in discussing the core
 of a market economy. More generally, the description of a game in "outcome-characteristic
 function form" specifies the following. Each player i E N has a set Si of personal outcomes
 that might potentially obtain. The description of a personal outcome describes all the
 aspects of the outcome which are relevant to player i. Then player i's preferences depend
 only on which personal outcome obtains. The characteristic function describes which
 vectors of personal outcomes a coalition can somehow guarantee for its members. In
 general, this set depends on the outcomes obtaining for players outside the coalition. Thus
 for each coalition B there is a correspondence FB HieN Si -e -e HfiB Si that describes the
 set of feasible outcome vectors for the coalition. Finally there is a set F c li, eN Si of
 jointly feasible outcome vectors. This set F may be different from {x: x E FN(x)}.
 A coalition B blocks an outcome vector x if there is some yB E FB(x) such that each
 member of B prefers yB to x. The set of all jointly feasible outcome vectors that are
 unblocked by any coalition is the core of the game.
 An example is given by a pure exchange economy. A personal outcome for player i
 consists of a consumption vector. Player i's preferences depend only on his own consump-
 tion. The set Si is just player i's consumption set. For each coalition B, FB is the set of
 allocations of B's aggregate endowment among its members. In this example FB does not
 depend on the consumption of players outside of B and F = FN. The core of the game
 defined this way coincides with the usual definition of the core of the market.
 The theorem below provides a set of sufficient conditions on a game which guarantee
 the nonemptiness of its core, even if preferences are not required to be transitive or
 complete. The major requirement is a kind of balancedness condition. The proof of the
 theorem is followed by a discussion of the difference between the notion of balancedness
 used here and Scarf's [5] balancedness condition. The theorem is then used to prove a
 I I am indebted to Michael Maschler, Roger Myerson, Bezalel Peleg, Jim Snyder, and Nicholas
 Yannelis for insightful comments.
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 new result on the nonemptiness of the core of a coalitional production economy without
 ordered preferences.
 2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
 A game G is a tuple (N, (Si), (FB), F, (Pi)) where N = { 1,. . ., n} denotes the set of
 players. Each player i has a set Si of personal outcomes potentially available to him.
 Preferences are represented by a correspondence Pi: Si- -e Si. The interpretation is that
 zi E Pi(xi) means that zi is strictly preferred to xi. Note that i's preferences depend only
 on his personal outcome. For each coalition B c N let SB = iB Si and set S = ieN Si
 Given the outcome vector x, the set of outcomes which are jointly feasible for members
 of coalition B is denoted FB(X)C SB. The set of all jointly feasible outcome vectors is
 denoted by F c S.
 The core of G = (N, (Si), (FB), F, (Pi)) is the set of all x E S satisfying
 (i) x E F,
 and
 (ii) there is no B c N and ZB E FB(X) satisfying ZB E Pi(xi) for all i E B.
 Let 8 be a family of subsets of N. For each i E N, let ,8(i) = {B Ep/: i E B}. The family
 /3 is balanced if there are scalars {AB : 0: B E /3} (called balancing weights) such that for
 each i E N,
 E AB=l.
 BesG(i)
 Let al, ... , a' be an affinely independent set of vectors and set mB = (I/jBI) XieB a'. Then
 ,8 is a balanced family if and only if mN E co {mB: B E /3}, where co denotes the convex
 hull. (If mN = BEI3 BaBmB then balancing weights may be found by setting AB = (n/IBI)aB.)
 The game G is balanced if whenever 8 is a balanced family with balancing weights
 {AB}, and XB E F,B(z) for each B E /3, then x E F where xi = XBeI(i) ABxi.
 3. NONEMPTINESS OF THE CORE
 THEOREM: Let G = (N, (Si), (FB), F, (Pi)) be a game satisfying:
 1. For each i, Si is a nonempty convex subset of Rk.
 2. For each nonempty B c N, FB: S e e SB is a continuous correspondence with compact
 values and for each i, Ft'l is nonempty-valued.
 3. F is compact and convex.
 4. For each i, (a) Pi has open graph in Si x Si; (b) xi A co Pi(xi).
 5. G is balanced.
 Then G has a nonempty core.
 PROOF: The first claim is that we may without loss of generality assume that PF(xi) is
 convex and xi,Pi(xi). If not, we can replace Pi:Si,-e-->Si by P5i:Si -e->Si where
 Pi(x)=coPi(x). Then Pi will still have open graph and by Assumption 2b, xi Pi(x).
 If x belongs to the core of the game G defined by replacing Pi by Pi for each i, then x must
 also belong to the core of G. This is because if ZB EFB(X) implies zBA Pi(x), since
 Pi(x) c Pi(x), we have afortiori that zis- Pi(x). So for the rest of the proof we will assume
 Pi(x) is convex.
 Begin the proof of the theorem by defining vi: Si x Si -e R, by
 vi(zi, xi) = distance [(xi, zi), (Gr Pi)'],
 where Gr Pi = {(xi, zi) = zi E Pi(xi)}, the graph of Pi. (This construction is due to Shafer
 and Sonnenschein [6].) Each vi is continuous (as Gr Pi is open), and vi(zi, xi) > 0 if and
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 only if zi E Pi(xi). The function vi acts as a "pseudo-utility" for Pi, and possesses the
 following important property. Suppose vi(z4, xi) 2 w for k = 1, . .. , p. Let zi be a convex
 combination of z, ..., z--. Then vi(zi, xi) 2 w, i.e., vi is quasi-concave in its first argument.
 The proof of this may be found in the Appendix.
 For each B c N set
 VB(x) = {w E RN: 3zB E FB(x) Vi E B, wi < vi(z4, xi)}.
 If i s B, then w E VB(x) places no restriction on wi. Thus x is in the core if and only if
 x E F and UB,N VB(X) rN = 0. Note that VB(x) may be empty, but each Vf'l(x) is
 nonempty. Since {{i}: i e N} is a balanced family with weights A j} = 1, and since each
 FP'l is nonempty, balancedness of G implies that F is nonempty.
 The sets VB(x) are analogues of the characteristic function of a game without side
 payments and the arguments of Shapley [7] and Ichiishi [4] may be applied. The following
 line of argument is similar to Ichiishi [4].
 Since each vi is continuous and since F is compact and each FB is continuous and
 compact-valued, there is some M - 0 such that for all x E F, and ZE FB(x), VI(4, Xi) < M
 for all i E B. Put a' = -Mne' E R' (where e' is the ith unit coordinate vector of R n) and
 set a=co{a': iE N}. For each BcN, set mB=(l/IBI)XFi.EBa.
 For each y E A set
 7(y,x)=max t>O:y+t(l, ..., 1)E U VB(x)I,
 BC N
 and put w(y,x)=y+r(y,x)(l,...,1). Note that r(y,x)<M(n+l) and w(y,x)<
 M(1, I ..., 1). Since vi is always nonnegative, V{k}(x) always includes {w: Wk 0}. Suppose
 that some wk(y,x)<O; then w(y,x)=y?+r(y,x)(1,..., 1) is in the interior of V{k}(X),
 which contradicts the definition of r. Thus w(y, x) - 0.
 The next step is to show that if xe F and w(y, x)< 0, then x is in the core. Suppose
 not. Then for some ZB E FB(X), Z4' E Pi(X) for all i E B, so vi(z4', xi) > 0 for all i E B. Thus
 there is a w E VB(x) with w> 0. But then y +r(y, x)(1,..., 1) = w(y, x) < 0< w is in the
 interior of VB(x), which contradicts the definition of i. Note that w(y, x) < 0 implies that
 w(y, x) = 0 (as w(y, x) - 0) and so y = MN.
 Thus the search for an element of the core has been reduced to the following problem:
 Find x E F and y E A such that w(y, x) - 0. To this end make the following constructions.
 Define
 E(x, y) = {z E F: z minimizes distance [v(*, x), {w: w - w(y, x)}]}
 where the ith component of v(x, y) is vi(xi, yi). Define y, ,: F x A F x A by
 Y(X, y) ={X X CO {mB: W(y, X) E VB(x)}
 and
 ,u(x, y) = co E(x, y) x{mN}.
 The correspondences y and ,u so defined satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 6 of Fan
 [2]. The statement of Fan's theorem and the proof of this claim is given in the Appendix.
 It follows from Fan's theorem that there are xj, 9, x*, y* satisfying
 (x, j) E=4 F(x *, y *) r) 7(x *, y*)
 In other words,
 (1) xecoE(x*,y*),
 (2) 9-mN,
 (3) x *
 (4) yEco {mB: w(y*, x*) E VB(x*)}.
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 By (2) and (4), 13 = {B: w(y*, x*) E VB(x*)} is balanced. Let {AB} be the associated
 balancing weights. By the definition of VB, for each B E ,3 there exists zB E FB(x*) satisfying
 wi(y*, x*) ? vi(z4, X4) for all i e B. Since the game is balanced, z* e F where z' =
 dB3(i) AB4. Since z4 is a convex combination of the 4 for BE /3(i) and Vi(4 4) *
 wi(y*, x*), it follows by quasi-concavity that vi(z*', x*) : wi(y*, x*).
 By (1) and (3), x* E co E(x*, y*). Since z* E F and v(z*, x*) - w(y*, x*) it follows from
 the definition of E that if z e E(x*, y*), then v(z, x*) : w(y*, x*). Suppose that
 wi(y*, x*) > 0 for some i. Then for all z E E (x*, y*), v1(zi, X4) > 0 as well, so that zi E Pi(X4).
 Thus x* E co E (x*, y*) implies that x* E co Pi (x* ), a contradiction. Thus wi (y*, x*) S O.
 Also since F is convex and E(x*, y*) c F, it follows that x* E F. Thus x* is in the core.
 Q.E.D.
 5. THE BALANCEDNESS CONDITION
 The balancedness condition in this paper is due to Boehm [1] and implies Scarf's r5]
 condition. Scarf worked with games in utility-characteristic function form, but the natural
 translation of his condition in the current framework is as follows. Let x E S and let ij.B(X)
 denote the projection of x on SB. Scarf's condition is that if 'rB(x) E FB(z) for all B in
 some balanced family 8, then x E F. This follows from the balancedness conditions used
 here by simply noting that xi = ZBe3P(i) ABITB(x)i, where {AB} is a collection of balancing
 weights for ,3. Scarf's condition is inadequate to prove the theorem with the techniques
 used above, so that this theorem cannot be viewed as a strict generalization of Scarf's
 theorem.
 6. THE CORE OF A COALITIONAL PRODUCTION ECONOMY
 The above theorem has as an immediate consequence the following result for coalitional
 production economies. The model adopted is essentially that of Boehm [1]. The commodity
 space is Rm. Each agent i has a consumption set Si c R', endowment wi Si, and preference
 correspondence P: Si -> -e Si. Each coalition B has a production set yB c Rm and the
 aggregate production set is Y c R m. An allocation is an (x', . .. , x") E H1 ,N Si satisfying
 E x'- E w'E Y.
 ieN ieN
 Allocation x = (x', . .. , x") is blocked by coalition B if there is some zB = (zE)B ESB
 satisfying iEB ZBi eB Wi E yB and for all i E B, zi E Pi(x'). The core of the economy is
 the set of unblocked allocations.
 PROPOSITION (cf. Boehm [1]): Assume that (1) for each i, Si is closed, convex and
 bounded below; (2) for each i, Pi has open graph and x'i~ co Pi(x'); (3) for each i,Oe y{i};
 (4) for each Bc N, YB is closed; (5) Y is closed and convex and AYnr4Rm ={0}, where
 AY denotes the asymptotic core of Y; (6) for each balanced family ,3 of coalitions with
 balancing weights {AB}, ZBe3 ABYB C Y. Then the core of the economy is nonempty.
 PROOF: Set
 FB(x) = {zBE SB: E ZB_ E Wi YB}
 i r-B i r-B
 and
 F={XES: YE xi- E WN} Y
 i r-N i r-N
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 Then F is compact by (1) and (4) and convex by (4). It is easily seen that (6) implies
 that the resulting game is balanced. Condition (3) implies that each F{i} is nonempty.
 Thus by the theorem above, the core is nonempty. Q.E.D.
 This theorem differs from Boehm's in two respects. First, preferences are not assumed to
 be transitive or complete. This is traded for the additional assumption needed here that the
 aggregate production set Y is convex.
 California Institute of Technology
 Manuscript received July, 1983; revision received January, 1984.
 APPENDIX
 Quasi-concavity of vi in its First Argument
 For convenience, the common subscript i will be omitted. Let v(zk, x)3- w, k = 1..p, and let
 z=ZP1 Akzk be a convex combination of z',..., zP. Then v(z, x) > w.
 If w O, the result is trivial. If w>O, let Nw(x, zk) be an open ball of radius w about (x, zk).
 From the definition of v, Nw(x, zk) c Gr P, for all k = 1, . . ., p. Let (x', z') E N (x, z). Then I(x'- x,
 z'-Z)l < w so
 (x + (x' -x), zk + (z -z)) E N (x, z k) c Gr P.
 Thus zk + z'- z E P(x'). Since we may assume that P(x') is convex,
 P
 z'= Ak(Z +Z Z)EP(X ) Y_Ak p=XI k=1
 so that (x', z') E Gr P. Thus Nw(x, z) c Gr P, so v(z, x) : w.
 The Correspondences y and /.t Satisfy the Hypotheses of Fan's Theorem
 The proof relies on the following result which is a special case of a theorem of Fan [2, Theorem
 6]. Let K c R' be compact and convex, and let y, A: K -* -* R' be upper hemi-continuous with
 nonempty compact convex values. Suppose that for each x e K there exist three points y e K,
 u E y(x), v E p(x) and a real number A > 0 such that y = x +A(u - v). Then there is a z E K such that
 7(z) r- A (z) 0 0.-
 It is straightforward to verify that y and ,11 are upper hemi-continuous with nonempty compact
 convex values. It is harder to see that for every (x, y) E F x A, there exist (x', y') E Ap(x, y), (x", y") c
 y(x, y) and A > 0 satisfying
 [(x, y) + A(x', y') -(x", y")] E F x A.
 The argument is virtually identical to one used by Ichiishi [4] with only slightly different corre-
 spondences. Put x" = x, y' = mN, and choose any x'cE co E(x, y). Then
 x +A (x'- x") = (1 -A )x + Ax' E F
 for any A E [0, 1]. Let B c N = {i: y, < O}. Set rB(x) = {j E A: w(j, x) E VB(x)}. It is shown below that
 co {a: ie B}c UC,B rC(x). Giventhis, choose Cc B sothatye rC(x). Puty"= mc. Then (x", y")e
 y(x,y). For A e[0, 1], define yA =y+A(y'-y")=y+A(mN-mc). Then
 n n n n
 E yi= E y,+A E mNi-Z mcJ =-Mn+A(-Mn+Mn)=-Mn
 i=1 i=l 1=1 1=1
 and if A is small enough, yA 6 0 SO yA E a.
 The argument that co {a'li E B} c UCCB rC(x) for all B is due to Shapley [7]. If B = N this just
 says that w(y, x) e Vc(x) for some C, so suppose that B $ N, so that IBI < n. Let ye rC(x) r-
 co {a': i E B}. We need to show that Cc B. Since yE rC(x), w(y, x) E VC(x), so w,(y, x) =
 yj + r(y, x) S M for all j E C. But ZjeB y, = -Mn, and for some k E B, Yk is less than equal the average
 of the y,'s forj E B, so Yk - -Mn/IBI < -M as |B? < n. But w(y, x) ? O so Yk + r(y, x) ? O, so r(y, x) > M
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 This and yj +r(y, x) s M for j E C imply that yj < 0 for all j E C. Since y E co {a': i E B} and y, < O
 for j E C, it follows that C c B. Q.E.D.
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